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PROTECTING THE PERSECUTED AND FULFILLING THE TRUE
GOALS OF A WAR ON TERROR THROUGH
IMMIGRATION POLICY
Samia A. Malik'
I. Introduction
September 11, 2001 awoke awareness in the world, and particularly in the
United States, of the potential for religious and politically motivated terrorism
instigated by a group of extremists who associate themselves with, but who do
not represent, the Islamic faith. In Pakistan, a country that is at the center of and
has played a key role in the Bush Administration's "war on terror,"' religious
minorities have faced religious and politically motivated violent behavior and
social ostracism triggered by the same extremists who sympathized with the Sep-
tember 11 terrorist attacks and support similar extremist ideologies. 2 One of
these persecuted minority groups in Pakistan are the Ahmadis. Ahmadis consider
themselves Muslims, but Pakistani law does not regard them as such. 3 Unfortu-
nately, these persecuted minorities have difficulty finding refuge in the United
States. The September 11 attacks have hindered immigration from Muslim coun-
tries, including the immigration of persecuted minorities.4
Imagine an Ahmadi family escaping a country that does not allow them to
practice and teach their faith freely to their children. They seek asylum in the
United States, a country that is fighting a "war on terror" against those who
prohibit others to freely and legally practice their religious beliefs. When the
family arrives in the United States, because they hail from a specific country, in
this instance Pakistan, it is presumed that they align themselves with similar
views as other citizens in their home country and have ties to terrorism. 5
t Samia Malik is a 2006 Juris Doctor candidate at Loyola University Chicago School of Law.
B.A., University of Chicago, 2001.
1 Pakistan has been a key ally of the United States in the 'War on Terror' after September 11, 2001,
particularly by providing logistical support to dissolve the Taliban regime and hunt for A1-Qaeda opera-
tives on the border of Pakistan and Afghanistan and by providing ideological support to the United States
in suppressing the terrorist groups within its borders. Prior to September I1, Pakistan recognized and
supported the Taliban government in Afghanistan. See Bush Renews Support for Musharraf, BBC NEWS,
Dec. 4, 2004, at http://news.bbc.co.uk/l/hi/world/americas/4067881.stm. (last visited March 14, 2005).
See also Tony Karon, Why the U.S. Anti-Terror War is a Crisis for Pakistan, TIME ONLINE EDITION,
Sept. 15, 2001, at http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,175058,00.html (last visited March 14,
2005).
2 See generally Amjad M. Khan, Persecution of the Ahmadiyya Community in Pakistan: An Analysis
Under International Law and International Relations, 16 HARV. HUM. RTs. J. 217 (2003).
3 PAK. CONST. pt. XII. ch. 5, arts. 260(3)(a), 260(3)(b).
4 Lori Adams, U.N. Report: Refugee Rights in the U.S. Scaled Back by Recent Anti-Terrorism Legis-
lation: Are We Violating the United Nations Refugee Convention?, 19 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 807,
809-10 (2003).
5 Muneer I. Ahmad, A Rage Shared by Law: Post-September 11 Racial Violence as Crimes of Pas-
sion, 92 CAL. L. REV. 1259, 1274-75 (2004).
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But in fact, they are simply trying to escape these fundamentalist ideologies.
They are not of the country they left behind and are received with skepticism by
the country they wish to accept. This scenario outlines the plight of the
Ahmadiyya Muslim Community. The end result is a peaceful religious commu-
nity effectively being ignored (by the United States) and given negative treatment
(by Pakistan) from two countries that are integral to the "war on terror."
Pakistan was partitioned from a mostly Hindu India in 1947 because Muslims
desired an independent state-one that is not simply different based upon its
foundation in a particular religious dogma. 6 Founding Father Muhammad Ali
Jinnah designed Pakistan on the proposition that religious and cultural minorities
would have their place and equal rights in the new nation.7 Over time, the rela-
tively secular state was transformed into an Islamic Republic that followed a
rigid interpretation of Islamic law. 8 Fundamentalist religious clerics, who have
always maintained an increasing influence on the political structure of the coun-
try,9 approved and supported this transformation to the detriment of the religious
minorities.
Ahmadi Muslims make up a peaceful, religious community that has been in
existence for over a hundred years. 10 However, because of differences in certain
religious beliefs that some mainstream Muslims consider heretical and blasphe-
mous, Ahmadis have been declared a non-Muslim minority by the Islamic Re-
public of Pakistan."I In addition, Ahmadis have been at the forefront of
persecution by both individual citizens and the Pakistani government even before
the country's "Islamization."' 12 This eventually led to problematic amendments
to the Constitution and anti-blasphemy provisions in its Penal Code.13 The cur-
rent Constitution generally limits minority citizen rights14 and legally confirms
that Ahmadis are non-Muslim. 15 The Penal Code punishes minorities for what is
considered blasphemy and specifically targets Ahmadis. 16 Thus, the laws are the
6 Khan, supra note 2, at 220.
7 Muhammad Ali Jinnah, address at the Karachi Club (Aug. 11, 1947), available at http://www.
pakistani.org/pakistanegisatiiaconstituentaddress_ilaug1947.htmL (last visited March 12, 2005).
See also Pak. Const., pt. I, ch. 1, art. 20. "Subject to law, public order and morality:-(a) every citizen
shall have the right to profess, practice and propagate his religion: and (b) every religious denomination
and every sect thereof shall have the right to establish, maintain mange its religious institutions."
8 See Khan, supra note 2, at 224
9 Molly Moore, Imposition of Strict Islamic Law is Transforming Once Moderate Pakistan, WASH.
POST, October 21, 1993, at A29.
10 See Ahmadiyya Muslim Community, The Ahmadiyya Movement in Islam: An Overview, at
http://alislam.org/introduction (last visited Feb. 2, 2005).
11 See PAK. CONST. Pt. XII, ch. 5, arts. 260(3)(a), 260(3)(b).
12 Islamization is in quotations because Islamization of certain laws need not mean it is the
majoritarian or correct interpretation of Islamic law. Islamization, as referred to in this essay, is a term of
art that will refer to the most extreme interpretation of Islamic law.
13 Profile Series Pakistan, United States Department of Justice Report (1993), available at http:/l
wwwl.umn.edu/humanrts/ins/pakistan.pdf [hereinafter United States Department of Justice Report].
14 See PAK. CONST. Pt. III, ch. 2, art. 51; PAK. CONST. pt. IV, ch. 2, art. 160.
15 See PAK. CONST. pt. XII, ch. 5, arts. 260(3)(a), 260(3)(b).
16 See PAK. PENAL CODE §§ 298B, 298C (collectively referred to as Ordinance XX).
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crux of the current problem in Pakistan and legally justify any form of religious
persecution that an individual citizen may practice against the minorities.
This article does not attempt to propose an unrealistic solution to the persecu-
tion and maltreatment of minorities in Pakistan. It is unlikely at this time that the
government of Pakistan will have qualms about repealing constitutional amend-
ments that limit minority rights and that it will abolish ordinances in its Penal
Code that violate international human rights standards. Instead, this article will
focus on solutions through immigration of those adversely affected by these laws,
solutions that are consistent and not contrary to the goals of the "war on terror."
By taking persecuted minority groups off the backburner and highlighting their
problems in the global arena, the true war on terror can be legitimized in the eyes
of the world.
In order to do this, we must first educate ourselves about these minority
groups by looking at the history of their persecution. Part II will explain the crux
of the problem in Pakistan and what has led to the "Islamization" and legitimiza-
tion of the minority's inferior status in Pakistan. In Part III, the article will ad-
dress the problem closer to home, particularly how Ahmadi immigration in the
United States after September 11 has been hindered and greatly discouraged.
Next, in Part IV, the article will discuss that limiting the immigration of foreign-
ers, especially from Muslim nations, has had the greatest negative effect on
Ahmadis, and in this sense the "war on terror" has fissures that are small, but
significant. It will follow that the rationale of the "war on terror" may be deemed
hypocritical. Finally, in Part V, I will make a humble attempt to offer solutions
to the problems that Ahmadis are facing by proposing liberalized asylum for
those who can clearly establish their ties to the Ahmadiyya Muslim Community
which in turn may encourage the distant, yet feasible, goal of repealing rigid and
inhumane laws in Pakistan.
II. Pakistan's Minority Problem
At its establishment in 1947 and years prior, Pakistan stood by its promise of
religious freedom.17 Jinnah fortified this aim addressing the nation in the year of
its birth:
You are free; you are free to go to your temples, you are free to go to your
mosques or to any other place or worship in this State of Pakistan. You
may belong to any religion or caste or creed that has nothing to do with
the business of the State. 18
However, as a result of the increasing religious fundamentalism and the
greater influence of the religious right and religious clerics, who have their own
political agenda, Pakistan has slowly been transformed into a hub for religiously
motivated persecution and related human rights violations toward minorities.' 9
17 See Khan, supra note 2, at 220-21.
18 Muhammad Ali Jinnah, address at the Karachi Club (Aug. 11, 1947), available at http://www.
pakistani.org/pakistan/legislation/constituentaddress_l laug1947.html (last visited February 2, 2005).
19 See Khan, supra note 2, at 224.
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Though the religious right is a minority, they are active enough in spreading
political propaganda by using mosques and madrassas (religious schools) as fo-
rums to dominate society's views 20 that they now have a dominating presence.
For the purpose of background, one must understand the qualitative, theologi-
cal differences in the beliefs of Ahmadis and other mainstream Muslims. The
persecution of Ahmadis and the laws supporting this persecution are based in the
differences of the theological beliefs of non-Ahmadi or mainstream Muslims (in-
cluding the religious right who have exploited these differences for political pur-
poses) and Ahmadis Muslims. 21 Simply, mainstream Muslims do not believe
that a new prophet or messenger will follow Muhammad even though they do
believe that a Messiah will come, namely Christ.2 2 On the other hand, Ahmadis
believe that although Muhammad was the prophet of Islam and revere him as
such, he was followed by Mirza Ghulam Ahmad, who they consider to be the
Messiah of the age prophesized by Muhammad himself and whom they believe
has come not literally as Christ, but in his spirit.2 3 It is this difference concerning
the finality of the prophethood, caused by a different interpretation of scripture,
that has led many mainstream Muslims to consider Ahmadis to be heretical and
hence, not Muslims. 24 For mainstream Muslims, the belief that Muhammad was
the last prophet is a necessary component to their Islamic faith, and any other
interpretation would be considered bi'dah or innovation.25 The Ahmadis do not
read the scripture this way, and thus it is not a necessary component of their faith,
nor is it considered bi'dah in their eyes. 26 As Pakistan deviates toward a more
"Islamicized" nation, these differences in beliefs have attracted negative attention
(beyond just a difference of opinion), and the consequences to Ahmadis have
been grave. 27
The effect of this ever-increasing religious fundamentalism in Pakistan has
had legal consequences on two fronts which have exacerbated the maltreatment
of non-Muslim minorities, particularly Ahmadis. First, the original Constitution
of Pakistan has been amended many times to limit the rights and participation of
non-Muslim minorities in the government. 28 For example, two separate elector-
ates were created in 1978-one for Muslims and one for minorities- in which
20 U.N. Commission on Human Rights, 52d Sess., Provisional Agenda Item 18, Implementation of
the Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religion
or Belief, available at http://www l.umn.edu/humanrts/commission/country52/95-add 1.htm. [hereinafter
U.N. Commission on Human Rights]. See also David F. Forte, Apostasy and Blasphemy in Pakistan, 10
CONN. J. INT'L L. 27, 35-36.
21 See M. Nadeem Ahmad Siddiq, Enforced Apostasy: Zaheruddin v. State and the Official Persecu-
tion of the Ahmadiyya Community in Pakistan, 14 LAW & INEQ. 275, 278-81 (1995).
22 Id. at 279-80.
23 Waheed Ahmad, A BooK OF RELIGIOUS KNOWLEDGE 171 (1988).
24 See Siddiq, supra note 21, at 278-81.
25 Ali Khan, Islam as Intellectual Property: "My Lord Increase Me in Knowledge," 31 CUMB. L.
REv. 631, 661 (2001).
26 See Ahmadiyya Muslim Community, The Ahmadiyya Movement in Islam: An Overview, at
http://alislam.org/introduction (last visited Feb. 2, 2005).
27 See Khan, supra note 2, at 223-230.
28 United States Department of Justice Report, supra note 13.
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Muslims are authorized only to vote for Muslim candidates, and non-Muslims
may only vote for non-Muslims. 29 This had the effect of limiting minority partic-
ipation to the election of special representatives. 30 Also, particular to the Ahmadi
situation, though Ahmadis consider themselves Muslim, the Second Amendment
of the Pakistani Constitution was passed in 1974 that legally declared Ahmadis to
be non-Muslim and thus subject to minority treatment under the law.3 1 This
amendment was passed by the government as a result of the religious right who
assert that those who do not believe in the finality of the prophethood cannot be a
true Muslim.
32
Second, and more disturbing, is the Penal Code of Pakistan, namely Ordinance
XX which was promulgated in 1984, otherwise known as the "blasphemy
laws. ' '33 This ordinance is an example of the powerful influence that the relig-
ious right in creating legislation. The religious right threatened to commit vio-
lence against Ahmadis if their demands for changing the Penal Code were not
met.34 Under this law, Ahmadis commit "blasphemy" if they call themselves
Muslims or associate anything in their beliefs with Islam.3 5 "Blasphemy" in-
cludes defiling the name of the Prophet, an example of which could be challeng-
ing the finality of the prophethood. 36 The ordinance makes "blasphemy" a crime
punishable by fine or imprisonment and was amended in 1991 to include punish-
ment by death without any possible form of appeal. 37 Human rights groups call
the blasphemy laws draconian and believe that the prosecution can meet its bur-
den of proof very easily. 38 No longer is this ordinance a formality that simply
gives government and citizens an excuse to persecute and commit human rights
violations against minorities. Its purpose to punish was fulfilled this very year
when an Ahmadi citizen was sentenced to death and charged with the crime of
"blasphemy."' 39 Inevitably, these legal justifications and succumbing to the relig-
ious rights demands has the intended consequence of a giving a carte blanche for
29 See Pak. Const. pt. III, ch. 2, art. 51; Pak. Const. pt. IV, ch. 2, art. 160. See also U.N. Commission
on Human Rights, supra note 20.
30 United States Department of Justice Report, supra note 13.
31 See Pak. Const. pt. XII, ch. 5, arts. 260(3)(a), 260(3)(b).
32 See Khan, supra note 2, at 225. See also Pak. Const. pt. XII. ch. 5 arts. 260(3)(a), 260(3)(b) which
defines Muslim as "a person who believes in the unity and oneness of Almighty Allah, in the absolute
and unqualified Prophethood of Muhammad (peace be upon him), the last of the prophets, and does not
believe, or recognize as a prophet or religious reformer, any person who claimed or claims to be a
prophet, in any sense of the word or any description whatsoever, after Muhammad (peace be upon him)."
Subsection (b) defines a non-Muslim as "a person belong to the Christians, Hindus, Sikh, Buddhist or
Parsi community, a person of the Quadiani Group or Lahori Group (who call themselves 'Ahmadis' or by
any other name) or a Bahai, and a person belonging to any of the Scheduled Castes."
33 See PAK. PENAL CODE §§ 298B, 298C (collectively referred to as Ordinance XX).
34- United States Department of Justice Report, supra note 13.
35 See PAK. PENAL CODE §§ 298B, 298C.
36 Id.
31 Id.
38 See Pakistani Gets Life for Blasphemy, BBC NEws, Nov. 11, 2004, at http://news.bbc.co.uk/l/hi/
world/south.asia/4055723.stm (last visited Feb. 2, 2005).
39 Id.
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the further persecution of non-Muslim minorities, particularly Ahmadis, with no
end in sight.40
It should be stressed that even before these laws were enacted, there was also
anti-Ahmadi agitation. 41 For example, religious clerics incited riots against
Ahmadis when the government refused to declare Ahmadis as non-Muslims in
1953.42 Further riots against Ahmadis in 1974 and pressure from clerics led
Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto to eventually declare Ahmadis a non-Muslim
minority. 4 3 Thus, these laws have been pushed into enactment by a growing
movement of "Islamization," and they encourage further "Islamization." 44 Ac-
cordingly, a call for repeal will not come easily, as seen in 2000 when President
Pervez Musharraf failed to repeal certain clauses in the blasphemy laws as rec-
ommended by human rights groups, most likely because the religious right con-
tinues to hold a strong grip on the affairs of government. 45 Furthermore, even if
such laws are repealed in the near future, the conscience of the country cannot be
changed on paper and overnight. In 1947, Jinnah's words show the conscience
of the country in an opposite light:
Even now there are some States in existence where there are discrimina-
tions made and bars imposed against a particular class. Thank God, we
are not starting in those days. We are starting in the days where there is
no discrimination, no distinction between one community and another, no
discrimination between one caste or creed and another. We are starting
with this fundamental principle that we are all citizens and equal citizens
of one State.46
It may take longer than the past 60 years to free Pakistan from these discrimi-
nations because of the rapid changes in both the sentiments of the people, the
legal buttressing of these sentiments, and the justification of further anti-Ahmadi
sentiment. A more feasible and immediate solution to protect Ahmadis who feel
that they are physically threatened and denied basic human rights is through the
facilitation and promotion of immigration to the United States.
40 See Persecution of the Ahmadiyya Muslim Community, Facts and Figures, at http://www.the
persecution.org/facts/facts_00.html (last visited March 15, 2005). In the year 2000 alone, 12 Ahmadis
were murdered for their faith and 166 Ahmadis were prosecuted for practicing their faith.
41 See U.N. Commission on Human Rights, supra note 20.
42 Siddiq, supra note 21, at 285.
43 Id. at 286.
44 See U.N. Commission on Human Rights, supra note 20.
45 See Pakistan's Blasphemy Law U-Turn, BBC NEWS, May 17, 2000, at http://news.bbc.co.uk/l/hi/
world/southasia/751803.stm (last visited Feb. 2, 2005).
46 Muhammad Ali Jinnah, address at the Karachi Club (Aug. 11, 1947), available at http://www.
pakistani.org/pakistan/legislation/constituent-address_ 1aug 1947.html (last visited March 12, 2005).
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III. Asylum Policy in the United States Post-September 11
The United States has seen historical patterns of change in immigration policy
as the needs of American society change.47 In early American immigration pol-
icy, aliens and immigrants were subject to the "classical immigration" policy,
limiting the entry of immigrants and rights of aliens already present and to "re-
taining" American "sovereignty. '48 Soon afterwards, the United States became
more liberal in its immigration policy as the need for immigrants increased and
the American image as a shelter for the "tempest-tossed" prevailed.49 After the
passage of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act
("IIRIRA") in 199650 and even more significantly, after the September 11, 2001
terrorist attacks, the "immigration pendulum" has shifted again as the entrance of
immigrants into the United States has been hindered particularly for immigrants
who arrive from Muslim countries.
5 1
Surprisingly enough, these post September 11 changes in the immigration pol-
icy have also affected those individuals seeking asylum, most poignantly, those
individuals who are escaping persecution in these "terrorist" target countries.
52
Just as troublesome is the fact that post September 11, there is no telling when
the pendulum will shift back to a more open immigration policy or if it will ever
shift back at all. As it stands now, as long as there is a fear of terrorism and a
"war on terror," immigration will be limited even to the refugees and asylees.
Asylum seekers have historically been one of the most protected groups under
United States' immigration policy.53 In order to apply for asylum in the United
States, one must have a credible fear of persecution in one's country of origin.
54
This trend resonates with the ideological importance of the United States as giv-
ing hope to many across the globe who are persecuted by their own governments
and people. The policy did not call for the detention of asylees in the initial
processing of applications. 55 This all changed when a new policy, Operation
Liberty Shield, was announced in March of 2003, which was quickly terminated
by Secretary of Homeland Security Tom Ridge. 56 Under Operation Liberty
Shield, asylees from certain suspect countries (mainly Muslim majority coun-
tries), who would have otherwise been granted asylum on their claims of perse-
47 Peter H. Schuck, The Transformation of Immigration Law, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 12 (1984).
48 Id. at 6.
49 Id. at 34.
50 Nancy Morawetz, Understanding the Impact of the 1996 Deportation Laws and the Limited Scope
of Proposed Reforms, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1936 (2001).
51 Tom McCann, Lawyers Scramble to Help Immigrants Caught in the Net of Tighter Enforcement,
CHICAGO LAWYER, Aug. 2003, at 9.
52 See Adams, supra note 4, at 809-10.
53 Karen C. Tumlin, Comment: Suspect First: How Terrorism Policy Is Reshaping Immigration Pol-
icy, 92 CALIF L. REv 1173, 1190 (2004).
54 Immigration and Nationality Act § 235 (b)(1)(B) (2004).
55 Tumlin, supra note 53, at 1190.
56 Stephen H. Legomsky, The Ethnic and Racial Profiling of Noncitizens: National Security and
International Human Rights, 25 B.C. THIRtD WORLD L.J. 161, 196, n.8 (2005).
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cution, remained in custody and were detained throughout the processing
period. 57 Effectively, this policy would even apply to Iraqis fleeing the torture
chambers of Iraq because they hail from an "al-Qaeda" nation 58 and would simi-
larly apply to Ahmadis escaping the potential of being put in prison for their
beliefs under the blasphemy laws. Furthermore, even if an immigration judge
ordered the release on bond of someone seeking asylum, the Department of
Homeland Security had the power to intercept and overrule the judge. 59 Thus
these immigrants, who simply originate from the "wrong" country and have no
personal links to terrorism, are left "without a court system through which they
can clear their names."'60 They are treated as suspects first (under the presump-
tion that they have terrorist ties), and as a persecuted people in search of a haven
second.
Even after Operation Liberty Shield was terminated, there are still policies
including the profiling of immigrants from Muslim nations 6' and the IIRIRA's
mandatory detention provision62 that when combined have the same effect as
Operation Liberty Shield. Post-September 11 policies of the federal government
include mass arrests and the preventative detention of Muslim immigrants, con-
ducing secret immigration hearings for Muslims who were arrested and detained,
mandatory registration of Muslim immigrants, interviewing young immigrant
based solely on age, date of arrival, and country of origin.63 The mandatory
detention provision of the IIRIRA requires asylum seekers to be detained pend-
ing the outcome of the "credible fear" interview and they remain in detention
until their hearing before an immigration judge.64 Effectively, Operation Liberty
Shield remains alive in theory since asylum seekers originating from Muslim
countries will undergo more heightened scrutiny.65
The government defended Operation Liberty Shield and continues to defend
the current policies in the interest of national security as a way to prevent ter-
rorists from entering the United States under false asylum claims.66 It is also a
true tenet of international law that a country has no duty to lower its borders for
immigrants, even those who are persecuted, but that it does so at its own discre-
57 Philip Shenon, Threats and Responses: Immigration, N.Y. TIMES, March 19, 2003, at A22; See
also Press Release, Secretary Ridge, U.S. Dep't of Homeland Security, Operation Liberty Shield: Press
Briefing by Secretary Ridge (Mar. 18, 2003), available at http://www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/display?
content=525.
58 See Shenon, supra note 57.
59 Adams, supra note 4, at 811.
60 Id.
61 Thomas M. McDonnell, Targeting the Foreign Born by Race and Nationality: Counter Productive
in the "War on Terrorism"?, 16 PACE INT'L. L. REV. 19, 25-26 (2004).
62 Jaya Ramji, Legislating Away International Law: The Refugee Provisions of the Illegal Immigra-
tion Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act, 37 STAN. J. INT'L. L. 117, 143 (2001).
63 McDonnell, supra note 61, at 25-26.
64 Ramji, supra note 62, at 143.
65 Farish A. Noor, Morally Bankrupt War on Terror by the US, available at http://www.world
revolution.org/article/263.
66 Shenon, supra note 57.
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tion and out of its own generosity. 67 Yet, the United States is a nation that has
generously welcomed immigrants throughout its history, and such a generous
immigration policy is something that has proved to be a defining American value
that should not be quickly discarded.
Despite these possible arguments from the government and critics defending
Operation Liberty Shield, mandatory detention under the IIRIRA and post-Sep-
tember 11 immigration policies targeting immigrants from Muslim countries, the
policies are flawed in that they are so broad that they will have the same effect on
those genuinely escaping persecution and the potential terrorists themselves (who
often cause the persecution in the first place). 68 Thus, instead of severely limit-
ing the American value of giving refuge to the persecuted, the asylum policy
should instead be supplemented with more appropriate and effective security
measures. The goal should be to create a balance between the two interests of
American values and American security. 69
Furthermore, these changes in asylum policy for the persecuted undermine
standards of international law and thus the international ties that the United States
has made.70 If the United States wishes to hold strong ties with its allies in the
"war on terror," it must stand by its values of freedom and make sure these
values extend to those who are persecuted by the same individuals or groups who
have created the necessity for a war against terrorism. Another response to the
proponents of these rigid asylum policies is that detention of asylum seeking
refugees has done little to advance the goals of the war on terror.71 That is to
say, in hindsight none of the nineteen hijackers who carried out the September 11
attacks would have been identified under such method. Furthermore, there are
alternative methods that may better fulfill the goals for the war on terror. For
example, proceeding in the criminal justice system on specific knowledge so that
detainees may have access to an attorney would fulfill the same goal of discover-
ing any possible terrorist action and acting on it, but without a violation of funda-
mental rights. 72
With particular respect to the Ahmadi situation, Ahmadis have historically im-
migrated to Western nations because not only do they feel threatened and re-
stricted to practice their faith freely under the blasphemy laws, but they feel as
though they will not be able to flourish in a society that openly discriminates in
the employment and education sectors. 73 Though it is true that not every Ahmadi
67 Deborah E. Anker, Discretionary Asylum: A Protection Remedy for Refugees under the Refugee
Act of 1980, 28 VA. J. INT'L. L. 1, 3-4 (1987).
68 Adams, supra note 4, at 814.
69 Id. at 817-18.
70 James F. Smith, United States Immigration Law as We Know it: El Clandestino, The American
Gulag, Rounding up the Usual Suspects, 38 U.C. DAVIS. L. REV. 747, 791 (2005).
71 See Nora V. Demleitner, Misguided Prevention: The War on Terrorism as War on Immigrant
Offenders and Immigration Violators, 40 No. 6 CRIM. LAW BULLETIN 2 (2004). Proponents, including
Former Attorney General Ashcroft, argue that asylum seekers especially those that hail from Pakistan are
presumptive security risks and more likely terrorists than persecuted asylum seekers.
72 Adams, supra note 4, at 813.
73 United States Department of Justice Report, supra note 13.
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will be openly persecuted in Pakistan or subject to the blasphemy laws, the po-
tential is very possible and in the discretion of the one who brings the action and
the enforcer of the law.74 Furthermore, just the potential of being prosecuted
under the laws wreaks constant fear and would make even the simplest of activi-
ties like saying the Islamic greeting of "peace be upon you," an issue of life or
death, freedom or imprisonment. 75
In 1993, the United States Department of Justice reached the conclusion that
though cases may differ greatly, the discrimination of Ahmadis in Pakistan
reaches the level of persecution.76 The conclusion was made after looking at the
history of Ahmadis in Pakistan, social discrimination, and prosecution for blas-
phemy crimes. 77 Thus, a broad definition was given to the term "persecution"
which included acts of social ostracism like job discrimination and discrimination
in admission to universities and schools. 78 Accordingly, the Department of Jus-
tice recommended to asylum officers that asylum should be granted to Ahmadis
if the individual can authenticate that he is a member of the community. 79 Just
from this report, one can see that under the United States asylum policy before
September 11, 2001, Ahmadis who had their specific situation evaluated were
generally one of the protected groups of immigrants.
The tides, however, seem to be changing for Ahmadis just as they have
changed generally for many who wish to immigrate to the United States from
countries "associated" with or harboring terrorist organizations. There is more
scrutiny of those seeking asylum, even if they are a known persecuted minority
as seen by current post-September 11 policies emulating Operation Liberty
Shield. Hence, one may infer that this greater scrutiny also applies to Ahmadis
since they hail from an "al-Qaeda linked" country. Operation Liberty Shield type
polices would even scrutinize and apply to Iraqis who have escaped prison cham-
bers for asylum in the United States. 8°
Since these, when combined, have a new affect on asylum seekers, the overall
effect on persecuted minorities remains to be seen. Relevant to the Ahmadi situ-
ation even before post-September 11 policies were implemented, there is some
evidence that the definition of persecution has been limited in the case of
Ahmadis who often must prove physical harm and threat of immediate persecu-
tion for their beliefs. 81 This notion can be highlighted in a case that was decided
a few months after September 11. In Hakeem v. INS, there were several factors
that led the Court to deny Hakeem asylum in the United States. 82 One of these
reasons, relevant to stricter scrutiny of Ahmadis, was that Hakeem did not show
74 Id.
75 See PAK. PENAL CODE §§ 298B, 298C.
76 See United States Department of Justice Report, supra note 13.
77 Id.
78 Id.
79 Id.
80 Shenon, supra note 57.
81 Hakeem v. INS, 273 F.3d 812 (9th Cir. 2001).
82 Id. at 816.
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that he would be unable to practice his religion freely if he returned to Pakistan. 83
The Court also said that he did not face any threat to his physical person. 84 Thus,
the Court did not believe that there was "credible persecution," as required by the
statute.85 The decision was surprising even though there was sufficient evidence
and statistics showing that the Ahmadi situation in Pakistan is not a safe one and
that there is always the potential for prosecution under the law.
86
Cases such as this one and the new immigration policies set forth post-Sep-
tember 11 demonstrate that perhaps the administration is not realistically stand-
ing by its ideological goals for the war on terror-to spread freedom throughout
the world which will secure the homeland from terrorism.87 Immigrants are not
welcomed and instead are considered suspects, even those who genuinely seek
asylum from "al-Qaeda nations."'88 If we cannot provide freedom for immigrants
escaping countries where terrorism is rampant, how can we spread freedom
throughout the world and successfully win the war on terror? Though security is
an important goal for the nation, by studying which groups historically have been
persecuted in each country, a balance can be reached between issues of security
and issues of upholding American values, so as not to leave a particular immi-
grant group, like the Ahmadis, in a no man's land.
IV. Limitations On U.S. Asylum Policies and the Impact on Ideological
Goals of the U.S. War on Terror
Perhaps more consequential than the technical effect of Operation Liberty
Shield and similar policies on asylum seekers is the message it sends to the world
about the United States-led "war on terror." The Bush Administration has of-
fered two main goals for the war on terror. The first is to protect the homeland
from further terrorist attacks, thereby preserving our freedoms in the United
States. 89 The second is to spread the American idea of freedom through democ-
racy throughout the world, which in turn will protect the homeland from terrorist
attacks. 90 In his 2004 State of the Union address, Bush declared: "God has
planted in every human heart the desire to live in freedom."91 An example of this
second goal, of course, is the "liberation" of Iraq from a dictatorship, which ac-
cording to the current administration has also shielded the United States from
future terrorist attacks.
83 Id. at 816-17.
84 dat 817.
85 Id. at 816.
86 United States Department of Justice Report, supra note 13.
87 See Waging and Winning the War on Terror, at http://www.whitehouse.gov/infocus/achievement/
chapl.html.
88 Tumlin, supra note 53, at 1174.
89 See Waging and Winning the War on Terror, supra note 87.
90 See id.
91 President George W. Bush, State of the Union Address (Jan. 20, 2004), available at http://www.
whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/01/print/20040120-7.html.
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After understanding the legal ramifications to the Ahmadis of persecution in
Pakistan and being effectively ignored by United States' immigration policy, it is
necessary to see what implications these actions by both Pakistan and the United
States will have in the broader scheme, that is, on the ideological goals of the war
on terror. With respect to both goals, we have already established that detaining
asylum seekers and refugees does not necessarily aid the war on terror in the
technical sense. The question that follows is: "Do these policies give an over-
arching negative impression to our allies that our words do not correlate with our
actions? And accordingly, are these impressions from our allies causing the
goals for the war on terror to internally destruct?"
Though policies that have the combined effect of creating an Operation Lib-
erty Shield in theory are not given much attention domestically, human rights
organizations who frown upon these policies have brought them to the attention
of the international community.92 These policies violate international treaties
and conventions. 93 For example, a policy detaining refugees who seek asylum
from their country of origin violates Article 3 of the 1951 Refugee Convention.
94
Parties to this Convention, including the United States, must apply the provisions
of the Convention without "discrimination as to race, religion, or country of ori-
gin."95 Because the United States is clearly violating this provision and allied
nations have not taken similar drastic steps to hinder immigration to their coun-
tries,96 these nations will look at the United States' led war on terror with a
skeptical eye.97 This skeptical eye cast toward United States initiated policy that
denies basic rights to immigrants who are escaping persecution (or immigrants in
general) for the interest of American security is not a new phenomenon. 98 Of
course, as stated previously, the United States is under no duty to lower its bor-
ders for immigrants at the instructions of an international custom,99 especially
when its national security is at issue. Nonetheless, the United States cannot dis-
regard years of lowering its borders to immigrants, something that remains a
strong value for American ideology and an American policy that the international
community respects.
In the past, the United States has sacrificed liberties of immigrants based on
their race and national origin to "secure" the nation, like the rights of Russian
immigrants at the height of the Cold War, even if they may very well have been
92 Adams, supra note 4, at 813.
93 Id. at 812.
94 Id.
95 Id.
96 Smith, supra note 70, at 813-14.
97 See id. The author explains that a stricter asylum policy in the United Kingdom would be met with
great opposition. Accordingly, a change in American asylum policy that violates the Convention would
also be seen in a negative light in the UK.
98 Elizabeth M. McCormick, Enemy Aliens: Double Standards and Constitutional Freedoms in the
War on Terrorism, 19 CONN. J. INT'L L. 423, 435 (2004).
99 Anker, supra note 67, at 3-4.
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escaping the same Communist regime for which they faced suspicion. 100 The
end result is that these measures do not secure the nation, but to the contrary,
have undermined the goals of national security because the international commu-
nity cannot legitimize such actions as appropriate or necessary and thus cannot
work together in cooperative alliance with the United States.101 Thus, if we are
not able to keep a coalition of allies fighting against terrorism, the national secur-
ity of the United States will be less secure than when our allies are involved and
satisfied that the war on terror is a legitimate one. Some nations may not look to
these policies with a skeptical eye, but may try to emulate these policies thereby
further hindering the true goals for the "war on terror." Arbitrary detention of
immigrants (especially asylum seekers and refugees) sets a poor example for the
international community, specifically because of the assumption that by follow-
ing this template, the threat of terrorism will be annihilated.' 0 2
We are punishing the innocent and the-already-persecuted. For instance, the
Ahmadis are caught between a rock and hard place. First, the stricter asylum
policies hinder and discourage Ahmadis, who consider themselves to be Muslim,
from entering this country even though there is a well-founded, historical fear of
persecution. And second, if they are left in their homeland, they will be perse-
cuted on the same basis and by the same individuals against which the war on
terror is being fought. Thus, the plight of Ahmadis is forgotten by those who are
waging a war on terror (at least the United States) and they are persecuted by
those who are creating the terror.
Though we are focused on the United States, we can look at other nations who
are also involved in the "war on terror" and their correlating immigration policy.
Such a model will emphasize that though the United States' goal for the war on
terror may be simply to protect within its boundaries, other nations just as deter-
mined to fight terror have not ignored the plight of immigrants seeking a new life
for the sake of security. Canada, a nation that has an open immigration policy,
has also taken pre-emptive steps to fight terrorism by implementing stricter im-
migration policy post September 11, 2001.103 For example, the Immigration and
Refugee Protection Act brings a strengthened security element to Canada's immi-
gration and refugee program by interviewing all refugee claimants to verify their
backgrounds and past activities, 10 4 something the United States has always
done. 10 5 However, Canada's immigration policy is still more liberal than the
United States' and there is no sign of Canada exchanging its democratic princi-
ples for security, despite being pressured by the United States to adopt a stricter
100 McCormick, supra note 98, at 435 citing David Cole, ENEMY ALIENS, DOUBLE STANDARDS AND
CONSTITUTIONAL FREEDOMS IN THE WAR ON TERRORISM (2003).
101 id. at 437-38.
102 Adams, supra note 4, at 813.
103 Denis Coderre, address at the Renaissance Club (Mar. 11, 2003), available at http://www.cic.gc.
ca/english/press/speech/detroit.html
104 Id.
105 See U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, Case Presentation to the USCIS, available at
http://uscis.gov/graphics/services/refugees/Presentation.htm
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system of immigration.106 Critics may argue that Canada has not faced a terrorist
attack, and for this reason the situations between the United States and Canada
are not analogous.10 7 The threat of terrorism, however, is a global threat, and any
ally in the war against terrorism has the potential to be the target of a terrorist
activity, whether or not it is instigated by al-Qaeda or other terrorist groups.
Therefore, whether or not a terrorist attack has happened in a particular country
does not matter when the government has a duty to protect its citizens from
terrorism of any kind. Furthermore, as mentioned earlier, Canada continues to
take steps to secure its borders effectively, but has not shut out genuine immi-
grants seeking better lives for themselves. Canada remains steadfast with its goal
for immigration policy: "to promote domestic and international interests that take
into consideration demographic requirements as well as international agreements
to which Canada is a signatory." 10 8 Thus Canada's immigration policy seems to
go hand in hand with an effective war on terror. 10 9 That is to say, it is able to
secure its borders from potential terrorists but does not allow for any cracks in
the system, like the plight of persecuted minorities coming from Muslim
countries.
One may argue that perhaps it is not ironic at all that Ahmadis are forgotten by
those waging a war on terror, particularly the United States. Instead, the denial
of asylum or making the asylum process so much more difficult to Ahmadis and
those who legitimately must escape from human rights abuses in Muslim nations
highlights that perhaps the sole goal of the war on terror may be just to protect
the homeland for the citizens of the United States. That is to say, that the liber-
ties and freedoms enjoyed by immigrants coming to this country for fear of per-
secution in their homeland have become less important to the United States, even
though the United States is not necessarily more secure by making asylum more
difficult for genuine asylees. The Ahmadi situation is clearly unfortunate. As
the leader in the war on terror, the United States must be consistent in its goals
and its subsequent methods for carrying out these goals.
V. Realistic Solutions
Now that we have determined that shutting out persecuted minority groups is
not consistent with the American value of accepting persecuted minorities, the
question becomes, what can the United States specifically do to help persecuted
minorities who emigrate from Muslim countries, particularly the Ahmadis, who
have faced rejection from both Pakistan and the United States in what seems to
be the most unfortunate of circumstances and are the unfortunate by products of
this war on terror. Other proposed solutions to address this problem may not be
realistic or viable.
106 See Colin R. Singer, Should Canada Harmonize Immigration Policies with the U.S.?, Canadian
Citizenship & Immigration Resource Center (CCIRC), Inc., available at http://www.immigration.ca/us/.
107 But see Brad Johnston, Canada-Tracking the Terrorist Threat, available at http://www.lifesafety.
ca/documents/1s0009.htm.
108 Singer, supra note 106.
109 See id.
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From the history of Pakistan, described in Part II, appealing to the interna-
tional community to alter the Constitution or the Penal Code would not be a
realistic solution. The effect would be minimal in Pakistan since a broad spec-
trum of the nation has been tainted with years of hatred for this minority commu-
nity. In 1986, a House of Representatives Resolution calling for a repeal of
Ordinance XX and an end to the discrimination of Ahmadis in Pakistan was a
bold effort by the United States and pioneered an awareness of the Ahmadi situa-
tion.110 More recently, in 2002, a House of Representatives resolution urged
Pakistan to repeal Ordinance XX, the anti-blasphemy provisions of the Penal
Code, and the Second Amendment which declares Ahmadis to be non-Mus-
lim.1 1 ' Unfortunately, such a measure has proved to be ineffective, as Ordinance
XX and the discrimination of Ahmadis in Pakistan continue.
As this article has emphasized previously, the solution lies in the hands of
Western nations who have always promoted immigration of minority and perse-
cuted groups-and should continue to promote, not hinder, the immigration of
these persecuted peoples through asylum and conventional immigration. The so-
lution is a local one for each nation who supports the war on terror and has a
history of promoting immigration for asylum seekers and refugees. We cannot
expect a solution to this problem by influencing the politics of other nations or by
nation-building because the mindset of these nations will not be easily molded
and is deeply rooted in a particular interpretation of the faith which is often set in
stone because it is of divine origin.
With respect to the United States, policies such as mandatory detention and the
post September 1 th immigration policies targeting immigrants from Muslim na-
tions should be re-evaluated. First, they may not be effective. Second, they de-
feat the true goals for the "war on terror," as defined by the Bush administration,
because these policies often target those escaping persecution from "terrorists."
Thus, a legislative solution by the United States that would liberalize asylum
immigration for Ahmadis, even if they originate from Pakistan, an "al-Qaeda
nation," may directly help fulfill the legacy of America as a haven for the "tem-
pest tossed" and not sacrifice security at the same time. This can be done by
verifying the identity of an Ahmadi, as recommended by the Department of Jus-
tice in its 1993 report, by contacting the worldwide Ahmadiyya Community who
keeps records of its members.1 1 2
Promotion of asylum for Ahmadis will also legitimize the war on terror in the
eyes of those who continue to be skeptical about its true goals. In addition, al-
lowing the Ahmadis to find asylum in the United States will not make the United
States look like it is meddling in the politics of Pakistan, a nation where United
States foreign policy continues to be unpopular. Furthermore, liberalizing asy-
lum will not spark as much retaliation toward Ahmadis who continue to live in
Pakistan. If the United States were to directly influence Pakistani politics and
110 H.R. Res. 370, 99th Cong. (1986).
11 H.R. Res. 348, 107th Cong. (2002).
112 United States Department of Justice Report, supra note 13.
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legislation for the sake of Ahmadi dignity, it is likely that Ahmadis and Ameri-
cans would be colored the same in the eyes of Pakistanis.
Finally, promotion of asylum for Ahmadis might have a long term positive
effect on the situation that Ahmadis face in Pakistan. Granting asylum to
Ahmadis can indirectly cause the changing of the laws of Pakistan by empower-
ing this persecuted sect and giving them a voice in American society that can be
heard rather than stifled as it is now in Pakistan.
VI. Conclusion
The Ahmadiyya Muslim Community has much in common with the citizens of
the United States in a post September 11 th world. They both have been victims
of terrorism caused by small, yet powerful groups of extremists who support the
same ideologies. Yet Ahmadis have been shut out by both Pakistan and the
United States and seem to be trapped in a virtual no man's land. First, this is true
because the government of Pakistan supports the blasphemy laws that have been
promulgated due to increasing "Islamization" and this has resulted in further "Is-
lamization" of the country. And second, because the United States immigration
policy has disfavored those immigrants who seek asylum, even those who are
escaping persecution in their homeland, which includes Ahmadis.
If we are to find an immediate solution for this "loophole" in the war on terror,
we must look to our borders as a gateway to freedom rather than as an iron clad
fortress. Only time will tell whether the situation in Pakistan improves for
Ahmadis so that they do not have to leave their homes to seek freedom and equal
opportunities elsewhere. But for now, liberalizing asylum policy for Ahmadis
who can verify their place in the Ahmadiyya Muslim Community appears to be
the only safe, effective, and practical solution. Hopefully, the United States can
implement an immigration policy in the future that is consistent with both the
United States' legacy of immigration for the "tempest tossed" and the true goals
of the war on terror while not sacrificing the safety of the American people.
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